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more	 likely	 to	 face	 difficulty	with	 fees	 assessed	 during	 incarceration,	
more	likely	to	face	continued	monetary	charges	while	on	probation	or	
parole,	and	more	 likely	to	 face	 incarceration	based	on	 inability	to	pay	
criminal	 justice	 debt.6	 Moreover,	 the	 collateral	 consequences	 arising	




This	 Article	 describes	 Griffin	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 jurisprudence	
regarding	 a	 defendant’s	 ability	 to	 pay	 on	 the	 justice	 the	 defendant	
receives.	 In	 many	 ways,	 Griffin	 laid	 the	 foundation	 for	 case	 law	 and	
legislation	 designed	 to	 address	 equal	 protection	 and	 due	 process	
concerns	 for	defendants	who	 lack	 financial	 resources.8	Unfortunately,	
despite	subsequent	rulings	and	statutes,	actual	practice	shows	that	the	
justice	 system,	 instead	 of	 providing	 justice	 independent	 of	 wealth,	
remains	 a	 two-tier	 system	with	 wealthy	 defendants	 receiving	 justice	
while	those	without	resources	face	injustice.9	
This	Article	proceeds	in	three	Parts.	Part	II	focuses	on	the	promise	
of	Griffin	 and	 its	 progeny	 of	 Supreme	 Court	 cases	 to	 foster	 a	 system	
where	 justice	 is	 independent	of	a	defendant’s	wealth	or	 income	 level.	
Unfortunately,	as	Part	III	illustrates,	the	equal	justice	promise	of	Griffin	
has	 gone	 largely	 unfulfilled	 in	 modern	 society.	 Indigent	 defendants	
confront	and	struggle	with	a	different	system	of	justice	than	defendants	
who	have	financial	resources.	Moreover,	such	a	system	creates	collateral	
consequences	 that	 tend	 to	 perpetuate	 the	 inequities	 in	 the	 criminal	








	 9.	 See	 infra	pt.	 III.B.	The	concept	of	access	 to	 justice	 is	 related	 to	 the	 idea	of	equal	 justice;	
however,	it	focuses	on	the	ability	of	the	system	to	provide	resources	to	defendants.	The	question	of	
access	 to	 justice	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	Article.	 For	more	 information,	 see,	 e.g.,	 Deborah	 L.	










justice	 provided	 to	 defendants	 should	 not	 be	 dependent	 on	 one’s	
financial	resources.	 It	provides	a	brief	analysis	of	Griffin	and	develops	
how	 subsequent	 Supreme	 Court	 cases	 have	 expanded	 the	 reach	 of	
Griffin’s	equal	justice.	
A.	Griffin	v.	Illinois—Establishing	the	Promise	
Interestingly,	Griffin,	 the	 case	 generally	 cited	 for	 establishing	 the	
concepts	of	equal	justice	for	indigent	defendants	in	the	criminal	justice	
system,	dealt	with	an	indigent’s	struggle	at	the	appellate	rather	than	trial	
stage.10	 Specifically,	 the	 issue	 in	Griffin	was	whether	 the	 requirement	
that	defendants	pay	a	fee	for	a	trial	transcript	necessary	for	an	appeal	
violated	 the	 due	 process	 and	 equal	 protection	 rights	 of	 indigent	
defendants.11	 An	 Illinois	 county	 criminal	 court	 had	 convicted	 Judson	
Griffin	 and	 James	 Crenshaw	 of	 armed	 robbery.	 Griffin	 and	 Crenshaw	




needed	 to	 prosecute	 an	 appeal.’”12	 The	 trial	 court	 denied	 the	 request	
without	 a	 hearing.13	 While	 Illinois	 law	 waived	 transcript	 fees	 for	
indigent	defendants	in	capital	cases,	it	generally	did	not	permit	waiver	
in	other	criminal	matters.14	














grounds	 were	 raised.16	 On	 appeal,	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court	
vacated	the	judgment	and	remanded	the	matter.17	
Justice	Black	authored	the	plurality	opinion	joined	by	Chief	Justice	




criminal	 trials	 which	 allow	 no	 invidious	 discriminations	 between	
persons	.	.	.	[so	that]	all	people	charged	with	crime	must,	so	far	as	the	law	
is	 concerned,	 ‘stand	 on	 an	 equality	 before	 the	 bar	 of	 justice	 in	 every	
American	 court.’”22	 Further,	 he	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 concept	 that	
treatment	under	the	law	should	not	be	dependent	on	one’s	wealth	was	
not	a	new	idea,	instead,	“[p]roviding	equal	justice	for	poor	and	rich,	weak	
and	 powerful	 alike	 is	 an	 age-old	 problem.”23	 He	 compared	
























process	 and	 equal	 protection	 concerns	 laid	 the	 basis	 for	 scrutiny	 different	 than	 the	 traditional	
notions	 of	 scrutiny	 associated	 with	 either	 clause	 and	 applying	 this	 approach	 to	 voter	
disenfranchisement	based	on	the	inability	to	pay	criminal	justice	debt);	Brandon	L.	Garrett,	Wealth,	









bears	no	rational	 relationship	 to	a	defendant’s	guilt	or	 innocence	and	
could	not	be	used	as	an	excuse	to	deprive	a	defendant	of	a	fair	trial.”25	
Moreover,	 Justice	 Black	 asserted	 that	 concerns	 about	
discrimination	 should	 not	 be	 limited	 to	 trial	 but	 extend	 to	 appellate	
review.26	He	commented,	“[t]here	is	no	meaningful	distinction	between	
a	rule	which	would	deny	the	poor	the	right	to	defend	themselves	 in	a	
trial	 court	 and	 one	 which	 effectively	 denies	 the	 poor	 an	 adequate	
appellate	 review	 accorded	 to	 all	who	 have	money	 enough	 to	 pay	 the	
costs	 in	 advance.”27	While	 Justice	 Black	 conceded	 that	 states	 are	 not	
required	 to	 provide	 an	 appellate	 review,	 he	 found	 that	 if	 states	 do	
establish	an	appeal	process,	then	states	cannot	discriminate	based	on	an	
appellant’s	inability	to	pay.28	
Justice	Black	acknowledged	 that	 given	 the	 substantial	number	of	
reversals	of	criminal	convictions,	states	recognize	the	importance	of	the	
appellate	 process	 to	 the	 final	 determination	 of	 guilt.29	 As	 a	 result,	 he	
concluded	 with	 his	 often-quoted	 statement:	 “There	 can	 be	 no	 equal	
justice	where	 the	 kind	 of	 trial	 a	man	 gets	 depends	 on	 the	 amount	 of	
money	 he	 has.	 Destitute	 defendants	 must	 be	 afforded	 as	 adequate	
appellate	 review	 as	 defendants	 who	 have	 money	 enough	 to	 buy	
transcripts.”30	
The	 four	 dissenting	 Justices	 sympathized	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 a	
state	should	pay	for	the	indigent	defendant’s	transcript;	however,	they	
declared	 that	 the	 matter	 did	 not	 rise	 to	 the	 level	 of	 a	 federal	
constitutional	violation.	Instead,	the	dissenters	felt	that	the	issue	should	
remain	a	matter	of	state	policy.31	In	response,	Justice	Black	asserted	that	
























that	 states	may	 not	 “shut	 off	 means	 of	 appellate	 review	 for	 indigent	
defendants”	by	requiring	payment	for	a	trial	transcript.33	According	to	








public	 subsidy	 of	 frivolous	 appeals.36	 As	 he	 stated,	 the	 State	 should	
“neither	bolt	the	door	to	equal	justice	nor	support	a	wasteful	abuse	of	





justice	 system.39	 Since	 its	publication	 in	1956,	more	 than	3,380	 cases	
have	cited	Griffin,	and	the	Supreme	Court	has	referred	to	it	on	at	least	
















	 41.	 A	detailed	analysis	of	 the	 individual	 cases	discussed	 is	beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	Article.	
Many	 of	 them	 have	 already	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 substantial	 legal	 scholarship.	 Additionally,	 this	
2020]	 Griffin	v.	Illinois:	Justice	Independent	of	Wealth?	 405	
1.	Transcript	Fees	
Griffin	would	become	 the	 “watershed”	 case	 for	matters	 involving	
monetary	charges	for	transcripts.42	For	example,	in	a	per	curiam	opinion	
in	Eskridge	v.	Washington	State	Board	of	Prison	Terms	&	Paroles,43	 the	
Court	 relied	 on	 Griffin	 to	 find	 that	 the	 court’s	 refusal	 to	 provide	 an	
indigent	 defendant	 a	 trial	 transcript	 based	 on	 the	 trial	 court’s	





for	 the	possibility	of	 states	offering	 alternatives	 to	 free	 transcripts	 as	
long	 as	 states	 provide	 indigent	 defendants	 “as	 adequate	 appellate	
review	as	defendants	who	have	money	enough	to	buy	transcripts.”46	
Similarly,	 in	Draper	v.	Washington,47	the	Court	applied	Griffin	and	
Eskridge	 to	 find	 that	 a	 trial	 court’s	 denial	 of	 the	 requests	 by	 indigent	
defendants	for	free	trial	transcripts	on	the	basis	that	their	assignment	of	
errors	was	frivolous	violated	their	Fourteenth	Amendment	rights.48	The	
Court	 found	 the	 determination	 that	 a	 case	 was	 frivolous	 was	 an	




Fifteen	 years	 after	 Griffin,	 the	 Court	 extended	 its	 holding	 from	










cases	 dealing	with	 the	 indigent	 defendant’s	 right	 to	 a	 transcript	 provided	 at	 state	 expense”).	 A	
related	matter,	beyond	the	scope	of	this	Article,	is	how	courts	determine	if	an	individual	qualifies	












that	 “[t]he	 size	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 pocketbook	 bears	 no	 more	
relationship	 to	 his	 guilt	 or	 innocence	 in	 a	 nonfelony	 than	 in	 a	 felony	
case.”51	











on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	 Illinois	 Supreme	 Court	 rule	 applied	 only	 to	
felonies.57	 The	 Illinois	 Supreme	 Court	 also	 denied	 the	 defendant’s	
request.58	
On	 appeal,	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court	 not	 only	 extended	
Griffin	 to	 non-felony	 matters	 but	 also	 identified	 current	 concerns	
relating	to	the	abuses	associated	with	criminal	justice	debt.	For	example,	




an	 indigent	 accused	 as	 forced	 confinement.	 The	 collateral	
consequences	of	conviction	may	be	even	more	serious,	as	when	.	.	.	














	 58.	 Id.	at	193.	 	

















types	 of	 appellate	 fees.63	 For	 example,	 in	 Burns	 v.	 Ohio,64	 the	 Court	





to	 also	pay	 for	 an	 appeal	 to	 the	Ohio	 Supreme	Court.	Writing	 for	 the	























inability	 to	 pay	 a	 filing	 fee	 was,	 in	 certain	 respects,	 “more	 final	 and	
disastrous”	 than	 the	 denial	 of	 the	 payment	 of	 the	 transcript	 fee	 in	
Griffin.67	The	Court	reasoned	that	the	defendant	in	Griffin	at	least	could	
still	raise	trial	errors,	while	the	defendant	in	Burns	could	not	obtain	any	
review	 from	 the	 Ohio	 Supreme	 Court.68	 The	 Court	 declared	 that	
imposing	 “financial	 barriers	 restricting	 the	 availability	 of	 appellate	
review	for	indigent	criminal	defendants	has	no	place	in	our	heritage	of	
Equal	Justice	Under	Law.”69	




Fourteenth	Amendment,	 the	Court	 stated:	 “We	hold	 that	 to	 interpose	
any	 financial	 consideration	between	an	 indigent	prisoner	of	 the	State	
and	 his	 exercise	 of	 a	 state	 right	 to	 sue	 for	 his	 liberty	 is	 to	 deny	 that	
prisoner	the	equal	protection	of	the	laws.”72	The	Court	refuted	the	State’s	
claim	that	the	$4	fee	was	“an	extremely	nominal	sum”	declaring	that	“if	
one	 does	 not	 have	 it	 and	 is	 unable	 to	 get	 it	 the	 fee	might	 as	well	 be	
$400.”73	
3.	Appointed	Counsel	
Shortly	 after	 Griffin,	 commentators	 predicted	 that	 Griffin	 would	
become	 the	 basis	 for	 requiring	 states	 to	 provide	 counsel	 to	 indigent	
defendants.74	 Seven	 years	 later,	 in	 Douglas	 v.	 California,75	 the	 Court	
would	 require	 California	 to	 provide	 appellate	 counsel	 for	 an	 indigent	






















and	 poor.”79	 The	 Court	 found	 that	 California’s	 procedures	 of	 denying	
appellate	counsel	to	indigents	violated	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	
precluded	meaningful	appeals	for	the	poor.80	
On	 the	 same	day	 that	 the	Court	 issued	Douglas,	 the	Court	would	
release	 Gideon	 v.	 Wainwright81—its	 most	 famous	 case	 in	 the	 Griffin	





that	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment,	 as	 incorporated	 through	 the	 Fourteenth	
Amendment,	requires	states	to	provide	counsel	to	indigent	defendants	
in	felony	trials.85	In	rendering	its	decision,	the	Court	overruled	Betts	v.	
Brady,86	 a	 case	 involving	 “nearly	 indistinguishable”87	 facts	 where	 the	
Court	had	found	that	the	Sixth	Amendment’s	guarantee	of	the	right	to	
counsel	only	applied	 in	 federal	 courts.88	 Interestingly,	 in	Betts,	 Justice	
Black	authored	a	dissent	not	only	urging	the	majority	to	apply	the	Sixth	
























the	 Court’s	 decision,	 the	 opinion	 included	 language	 reminiscent	 of	

















with	 Griffin	 and	 ending	 with	 the	 Douglas	 requirement	 that	 indigent	
defendants	be	provided	counsel	in	their	“first	appeal	as	of	right.”94	
































a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 Court’s	 decisions	 relating	 to	 the	 use	 of	
incarceration	based	on	a	convicted	defendant’s	inability	to	pay	criminal	
justice	debt.	
In	 Williams	 v.	 Illinois,102	 the	 Court	 would	 first	 confront	 the	
“[s]ystematic	 discrimination	 against	 indigents	 in	 the	 disposition	 of	
convicted	 criminals.”103	 The	 issue	 was	 whether	 the	 state	 could	
incarcerate	 defendants	 unable	 to	 pay	 fines	 and	 fees	 beyond	 a	 state’s	
statutory	 maximum	 sentence	 period.104	 The	 trial	 court	 assessed	
Williams	 $5	 in	 costs	 and	 imposed	 the	 maximum	 sentence	 for	 petty	
theft—one	 year	 in	 prison	 and	 a	 $500	 fine.105	 Because	 Williams	 was	

























an	 appendix	 providing	 a	 state-by-state	 description	 of	 statutory	
provisions	relating	to	incarceration	for	failure	to	pay	fines.109	Moreover,	




equally	 to	 all	 persons.	 Subsequent	 decisions	 of	 this	 Court	 have	
pointedly	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 passage	 of	 time	 has	 heightened	




[T]he	 Illinois	 statute	 as	 applied	 to	 Williams	 works	 an	 invidious	
discrimination	solely	because	he	is	unable	to	pay	the	fine.	On	its	face	
the	statute	extends	to	all	defendants	an	apparently	equal	opportunity	




persons	 since	 the	 result	 is	 to	make	 incarceration	 in	 excess	 of	 the	




$425	 for	 traffic	offenses	 that	were	not	punishable	by	 incarceration.116	
Additionally,	 the	 court,	 relying	 on	 statutory	 provisions,	 ordered	 the	


















fine,	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 fine	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 jail	 term	 and	
whether	 or	 not	 the	 jail	 term	 of	 the	 indigent	 extends	 beyond	 the	
maximum	term	that	may	be	imposed	on	a	person	willing	and	able	to	





acknowledged	 the	 inefficiency	of	using	 incarceration	of	 indigents	as	a	
method	of	obtaining	revenue	for	the	state:	
Since	Texas	has	 legislated	a	 “fines	only”	policy	 for	 traffic	 offenses,	
that	statutory	ceiling	cannot,	consistently	with	the	Equal	Protection	
Clause,	limit	the	punishment	to	payment	of	the	fine	if	one	is	able	to	
pay	 it,	 yet	 convert	 the	 fine	 into	 a	 prison	 term	 for	 an	 indigent	
defendant	without	the	means	to	pay	his	fine.	Imprisonment	in	such	a	
case	is	not	imposed	to	further	any	penal	objective	of	the	State.	It	is	
imposed	 to	 augment	 the	 State’s	 revenues	 but	 obviously	 does	 not	
serve	that	purpose;	the	defendant	cannot	pay	because	he	is	indigent	
and	his	imprisonment,	rather	than	aiding	collection	of	the	revenue,	



















fines	 and	 restitution.123	 Bearden	 entered	 into	 an	 installment	 plan;	
however,	within	a	month	after	release	on	probation,	he	lost	his	job	and	
was	unable	 to	 secure	 employment.124	 Based	on	his	 failure	 to	pay,	 the	
court	revoked	probation	and	ordered	that	he	serve	the	remainder	of	the	







O’Connor	 traced	 the	 development	 of	 “Griffin’s	 principle	 of	 ‘equal	
justice.’”128	She	began	with	Justice	Black’s	equal	justice	quotation	from	
Griffin	 and	 discussed	 the	 convergence	 of	 the	 due	 process	 and	 equal	
protection	concerns	developed	in	Mayer,	Douglas,	Williams,	and	Tate.129	
She	 concluded,	 “in	 revocation	proceedings	 for	 failure	 to	pay	 a	 fine	or	
restitution,	 a	 sentencing	 court	 must	 inquire	 into	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	
failure	to	pay.”130	Subsequent	state	court	decisions,	legislation,	and	court	
rules	would	recognize	the	need	for	determining	a	defendant’s	ability	to	




same	 day	 and	 time,	 their	 experiences	will	 be	 completely	 different	






















comments	 in	2019	 reflect	 that	 the	 two-tier	 system	of	 criminal	 justice	
remains.133	 Turner	 became	 an	 advocate	 for	 criminal	 justice	 reform	
following	her	 incarceration	based	on	her	 inability	 to	pay	 traffic	 ticket	




not	 following	 the	 mandates	 and	 goals	 established	 and	 espoused	 by	
Justice	Black’s	basic	notion	of	equal	justice.136	The	growing	reliance	on	
criminal	justice	debt	has	exacerbated	the	problems	of	inequality	arising	
from	 a	 defendant’s	 lack	 of	 financial	 resources.	 In	 March	 2016,	 the	




escalating	 debt;	 face	 repeated,	 unnecessary	 incarceration	 for	
nonpayment	despite	posing	no	danger	to	the	community;	lose	their	jobs;	
and	become	trapped	in	cycles	of	poverty	that	can	be	nearly	impossible	


















to	 State	 and	 Local	 Courts,	 Dear	 Colleague	 2	 (Mar.	 14,	 2016),	 https://finesandfeesjusticecenter
.org/content/uploads/2018/11/Dear-Colleague-letter.pdf.	
	 139.	 Id.	at	3.	In	2017,	the	Department	of	Justice	withdrew	the	Dear	Colleague	Letter	as	part	of	its	
regulatory	 reform	 program.	Attorney	 General	 Jeff	 Sessions	 Rescinds	 25	 Guidance	 Documents,	 U.S.	
416	 Stetson	Law	Review	 [Vol.	49	
This	 Part	 briefly	 discusses	 the	 expanding	 role	 of	 criminal	 justice	
debt	in	the	modern	American	criminal	justice	system	and	how	the	failure	
to	 take	 into	 account	 ability	 to	 pay	 has	 created	 a	 two-tier	 system	 of	
justice.	
A.	The	Growth	of	Criminal	Justice	Debt	
Despite	 Griffin’s	 promise	 of	 a	 system	 where	 justice	 would	 be	
rendered	 independent	of	wealth,	 indigent	defendants	currently	 face	a	
system	where	the	imposition	of	criminal	justice	debt	creates	injustice.	





Since	 the	 1980s,	 criminal	 justice	 debt	 in	 the	 United	 States	 has	
grown	exponentially.143	Defendants	now	 face	 financial	 assessments	at	
every	 stage	 in	 the	 process	 from	 pre-conviction	 to	 supervision	 after	
release.144	 Pre-conviction	 charges	 include	 fees	 for	 arrest,	 booking,	 lab	
tests,	and	bail.145	Some	jurisdictions	also	charge	for	pre-trial	detention	
for	 defendants	 unable	 to	make	 bail.146	 Defendants	who	 seek	 a	 public	
defender	will	likely	be	charged	an	application	fee.147	
At	 sentencing,	 defendants	 are	 not	 only	 subject	 to	 fines	 and	







	 142.	 Fines,	 Fees,	 and	 Bail,	 COUNCIL	 OF	ECON.	ADVISERS	 ISSUE	BRIEF	 1	 (Dec.	 2015);	 SHAFROTH	&	
SCHWARTZOL,	supra	note	140,	at	2.	
	 143.	 Neil	 L.	 Sobol,	Fighting	 Fines	 &	 Fees:	 Borrowing	 from	 Consumer	 Law	 to	 Combat	 Criminal	
Justice	Debt	Abuses,	88	U.	COLO.	L.	REV.	841,	855	(2017)	[hereinafter	Sobol,	Fighting	Fines].	A	detailed	








	 146.	 See,	 e.g.,	 RYAN	GENTZLER,	THE	COST	TRAP:	HOW	EXCESSIVE	FEES	LOCK	OKLAHOMANS	 INTO	 THE	





thirds	of	states	allow	 judges	 to	require	defendants	 to	pay	 for	a	court-
appointed	 public	 defender.”149	 If	 incarcerated,	 the	 monetary	 charges	
continue	to	accrue	as	inmates	are	likely	to	be	assessed	charges	for	room	
and	board,	medical	care,	and	telephone	usage.150	Convicted	defendants	















governmental	 expenditures	 on	 criminal	 justice	 represented	 $937	 per	
capita—a	 significant	 increase	over	1982’s	 real	per	 capita	 spending	of	











Confinement	 in	 the	 U.S.	 with	 7	 New	 Infographics,	 PRISON	 POLICY	 INITIATIVE	 (Mar.	 19,	 2019),	
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/03/19/whole-pie/	 [hereinafter	 New	 Report,	 Mass	
Incarceration].	
	 154.	 EXEC.	OFFICE	OF	THE	PRESIDENT	OF	THE	UNITED	STATES,	ECONOMIC	PERSPECTIVES	ON	INCARCERATION	
AND	 THE	CRIMINAL	 JUSTICE	SYSTEM	3	 (2016)	 (identifying	 “the	 incarcerated	 population	 is	 4.5	 times	
larger	than	in	1980”).	
	 155.	 Wendy	 Sawyer	 &	 Peter	 Wagner,	Mass	 Incarceration:	 The	 Whole	 Pie	 2019,	 PRISON	POL’Y	
INITIATIVE	(Mar.	19,	2019),	https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html.	
	 156.	 Id.	





Budgetary	 concerns	 arising	 from	 increased	 criminal	 justice	
expenditures	 and	 the	 economic	 recession	 in	2008	 created	 even	more	
pressure	for	jurisdictions	to	collect	fines	and	fees.159	Relying	on	criminal	
justice	 debt	 as	 a	 means	 of	 funding	 activities—including	 activities	
unrelated	 to	 the	 charged	 offenses—has	 political	 advantages	 over	
increasing	taxes.160	





For	example,	 the	2015	Department	of	 Justice	 investigation	of	 the	
Ferguson	 Police	 Department	 found	 that	 the	 municipality,	 police,	 and	
court	 “worked	 in	 concert	 to	 maximize	 revenue	 at	 every	 stage	 of	 the	
enforcement	 process.”162	 Focusing	 on	 funding	 the	 city’s	 operating	
budget	 rather	 than	 public	 safety,	 the	 city	 created	 fine-able	 offenses,	
police	were	rewarded	for	issuing	citations,	and	the	court	imposed	fines	
and	 fees.163	 Attorney	 General	 Eric	 Holder	 categorized	 the	 Ferguson	
report	 as	 “searing”	 but	 also	 cautioned	 that	 the	 concerns	 were	 “not	
confined	to	any	one	city,	state,	or	geographic	region.”164	
Similar	 to	 the	 findings	 in	 Ferguson,	 jurisdictions	 have	 not	 only	


















	 165.	 KAREN	 DOLAN	 &	 JODI	 L.	 CARR,	 THE	 POOR	 GET	 PRISON:	 THE	 ALARMING	 SPREAD	 OF	 THE	
CRIMINALIZATION	OF	POVERTY	5	(2015).	
	 166.	 See	 id.	 at	 23–25	 (describing	 how	 “[p]eople	 without	 homes	 are	 increasingly	 targeted,	














Facing	 financial	 stress,	 jurisdictions	 have	 outsourced	 services	 to	
private	companies.171	Privatization	includes	not	only	the	development	
of	 privately	 run	 prisons,	 but	 also	 the	 growing	 reliance	 on	 private	
companies	 for	 a	 “variety	 of	 services	 and	 processes	 within	 U.S.	
courthouses,	jails,	and	prisons.”172	Although	private	prisons	house	only	
seven	 percent	 of	 inmates,	 nearly	 all	 inmates	 are	 subject	 to	 fees	 for	
services	 provided	 by	 private	 companies—including	 telephone	 usage,	
food,	 and	 medical	 care.173	 More	 than	 fifty	 percent	 of	 governmental	
expenditures	 for	 incarceration	 are	 paid	 to	 private	 vendors.174	 Private	
companies	may	be	involved	at	all	stages	of	a	defendant’s	interaction	with	
the	justice	system	from	pre-trial,	including	bail	and	testing	services;	to	
incarceration,	 including	 communication	 and	 food	 services;	 to	
supervision,	 including	 probation,	 monitoring,	 and	 drug	 testing	
services.175	 Additionally,	many	 jurisdictions	 use	 private	 collectors	 for	
the	collection	of	criminal	justice	debt.176	
Private	companies	often	provide	“offender-funded”	programs	that	
are	 attractive	 to	 jurisdictions	 facing	 budgetary	 concerns.	 Under	
















charging	 jurisdictions	any	fees,	 instead	relying	on	their	 funding	solely	
through	 fees	 collected	 from	 defendants.177	 Some	 jurisdictions	 even	






regulation.180	 For	 example,	 some	 private	 phone	 companies	 charge	
inmates	 exorbitant	 fees.181	 Similarly,	 private	 probation	 companies,	
when	 receiving	money	 from	probationers	 that	 should	 be	 allocated	 to	
court	 debt	 and	 probation	 supervision	 fees,	 may	 subtract	 their	 fees	
before	the	court	debt	so	that	individuals	remain	in	default	and	subject	to	
arrest	warrants	 for	 the	 outstanding	 debt.182	 Additionally,	 commission	
arrangements	with	private	collectors	that	provide	a	greater	percentage	
on	older	debt	 encourage	 collectors	 to	pursue	older	debt	while	 letting	
other	debt	 “age	 so	 that	 they	can	collect	on	 it	 later	and	receive	higher	
commission	fees.”183	
B.	Two-Tier	System	of	Justice	
The	 growth	 in	 criminal	 justice	 debt	 and	 the	 assessment	 of	 debt	
without	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 ability	 to	 pay	 has	 created	 a	 two-tier	
justice	 system.	 This	 differential	 treatment	 traps	 many	 indigent	
















	 181.	 HIGHSMITH,	 supra	 note	 175,	 at	 34–35;	 Neil	 L.	 Sobol,	 Connecting	 the	 Disconnected:	








sanctions	 arising	 from	 outstanding	 criminal	 justice	 debt	 strains	 the	
relationship	 that	 defendants	 have	 with	 law	 enforcement	 and	 judicial	
authorities.185	 This	 Part	 will	 briefly	 identify	 how	 the	 system	 treats	
indigent	defendants	differently	than	those	who	have	financial	resources.	
1.	Poverty	Penalties	
When	a	defendant	 is	unable	 to	pay	criminal	 justice	debt,	 it	 is	not	






court	 may	 allow	 installment	 payments	 but	 also	 require	 electronic	
monitoring.	Such	defendants	may	then	be	subject	to	additional	charges,	
including	 fees	 for	 installation,	 calibration,	 monthly	 monitoring,	 and	
removal.188	
2.	Collateral	Consequences	











Justice	 Policy	 Program	 at	 Harvard	 Law	 School	 maintains	 a	 searchable	 database	 of	 state	 laws	
regarding	poverty	penalties	and	poverty	traps	reflecting	enforcement	mechanisms	that	states	use	
to	 collect	 criminal	 justice	 debt.	Criminal	 Justice	 Policy	 Program	at	Harvard	 Law	 School:	 50-State	




defendants	 are	 placed	 under	 supervision	 because	 of	 their	 inability	 to	 pay	 criminal	 justice	 debt,	
subjecting	them	to	up	to	three	months	of	supervision	fees.	HARRIS	ET	AL.,	supra	note	141,	at	15–16.	
	 189.	 A	 full	 discussion	of	 the	 collateral	 consequences	 that	defendants	may	 face	 is	 beyond	 the	
scope	of	this	Article.	For	more	information,	see	MARGARET	COLGATE	LOVE,	JENNY	ROBERTS	&	WAYNE	A.	
LOGAN,	 COLLATERAL	 CONSEQUENCES	 OF	 CRIMINAL	 CONVICTIONS:	 LAW,	 POLICY	 AND	 PRACTICE	 (2018),	
Westlaw,	 COLLATC	 database.	 To	 access	 a	 searchable	 database	 of	 collateral	 consequences,	 see	
Welcome	 to	 the	 NICCC,	 NAT’L	 INVENTORY	 OF	 COLLATERAL	 CONSEQUENCES	 OF	 CONVICTION,	
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/	(last	visited	Apr.	8,	2020).	
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student	 from	practicing	medicine,190	 those	with	 unpaid	 criminal	 debt	
may	 be	 denied	 occupational	 licenses.191	 Additionally,	 the	 debt	 may	
disqualify	 them	 from	 public	 assistance	 benefits192	 and	 the	 right	 to	
vote.193	
Moreover,	 more	 than	 forty	 states	 suspend	 driver’s	 licenses	 for	




and	 obtain	 employment.196	 The	 suspensions	 lead	 to	 recidivism	 and	
safety	concerns	as	many	defendants	faced	with	the	prospect	of	the	loss	
of	 employment	 become	 unlicensed	 and	 uninsured	 drivers.197	 In	 one	
case,	a	driver’s	license	was	suspended	because	the	defendant	was	unable	
to	pay	a	$135	traffic	fine.198	Fearful	of	losing	her	job,	which	required	that	
she	 drive,	 she	 continued	 to	 drive	 and	 received	 additional	 tickets	 for	
driving	without	a	license.199	She	was	also	subject	to	increased	insurance	











is	 authorized	 in	 forty-eight	 states	 and	 the	District	 of	Columbia);	ALLYSON	FREDERICKSEN	&	LINNEA	
LASSITER,	DISENFRANCHISED	BY	DEBT:	MILLIONS	IMPOVERISHED	BY	PRISON,	BLOCKED	FROM	VOTING	5	(2016).	
	 194.	 Beth	 Schwartzapfel,	 43	 States	 Suspend	 Licenses	 for	 Unpaid	 Court	 Debt,	 But	 That	 Could	
Change,	 MARSHALL	 PROJECT	 (Nov.	 21,	 2017,	 12:47	 PM),	 https://www.themarshallproject.org/	
2017/11/21/43-states-suspend-licenses-for-unpaid-court-debt-but-that-could-change.	
	 195.	 Justin	Wm.	Moyer,	More	than	7	Million	People	May	Have	Lost	Driver’s	Licenses	Because	of	














ramifications.	 On	 any	 given	 day,	 local	 jails	 hold	 more	 than	 450,000	













for	 failure	 to	 make	 payments.204	 Numerous	 reports	 indicate	 the	
prevalence	of	modern-day	debtors’	prisons.205	
While	 incarcerated,	defendants	are	 subject	 to	additional	 criminal	
justice	debt	for	necessities,	including	food	and	health	care.206	If	inmates	






Study	 Says,	 PHILA.	 INQUIRER	 (Apr.	 29,	 2019),	 https://www.philly.com/news/philly-money-bail-
criminal-justice-community-bail-fund-20190429.html	 (describing	 a	 study	 in	 Philadelphia	 that	
black	defendants	remain	“awaiting	trial	at	a	rate	25	percent	higher	than	their	white	counterparts”);	
Lucius	Couloute,	New	Data	Highlights	Pre-Incarceration	Disadvantages,	PRISON	POL’Y	INITIATIVE	(Mar.	






PA.	 INTERBRANCH	 COMM’N	 FOR	 GENDER,	 RACIAL	 &	 ETHNIC	 FAIRNESS,	 ENDING	 DEBTORS’	 PRISONS	 IN	
PENNSYLVANIA	14	(2017)	(declaring	that	“Pennsylvania	courts	routinely	fail	to	assess	a	defendant’s	
ability	to	pay	before	imposing	incarceration”).	
	 205.	 See,	 e.g.,	 AM.	CIVIL	 LIBERTIES	UNION,	 IN	 FOR	 A	PENNY:	THE	RISE	 OF	AMERICA’S	NEW	DEBTORS’	
PRISONS	5	(2010);	AM.	CIVIL	LIBERTIES	UNION	OF	LA.,	LOUISIANA’S	DEBTORS	PRISONS:	AN	APPEAL	TO	JUSTICE	
9	(2015);	AM.	CIVIL	LIBERTIES	UNION	OF	NEB.,	UNEQUAL	JUSTICE:	BAIL	AND	MODERN	DAY	DEBTORS’	PRISONS	




&	 COLUMBIA	 LEGAL	 SERVS.,	MODERN-DAY	DEBTORS’	PRISONS:	THE	WAYS	 COURT-IMPOSED	DEBTS	PUNISH	





along	 with	 collateral	 consequences	 stemming	 from	 incarceration,	
including	 loss	 of	 employment	 and	 reduction	 in	 credit	 scores,	make	 it	
even	more	difficult	for	indigent	defendants	to	escape	the	debt	cycle.208	
IV.	RESTORING	THE	PROMISE:	REFORMS	&	RECOMMENDATIONS	










are	 not	 based	 upon	 defendants’	 ability	 to	 pay	 has	 the	 potential	 to	
promote	equal	justice.	
1.	Incarceration	
Bail	 reform	 is	 necessary	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 people	 who	
remain	 incarcerated	 solely	because	 they	 cannot	afford	bail.212	 Several	
	
	 208.	 Vallas	&	Patel,	supra	note	186,	at	135–36.	
	 209.	 Previously,	 I	have	addressed	and	developed	 in	more	detail	several	of	 these	reforms.	See	
Sobol,	 Charging	 the	 Poor,	 supra	 note	 131,	 at	 524–39	 (developing	 a	 framework	 for	 reducing	
incarceration	of	indigents	who	fail	to	pay	criminal	justice	debt);	Sobol,	Fighting	Fines,	supra	note	
143,	 at	 896–98	 (discussing	 a	 federal	 approach	 to	 addressing	 criminal	 justice	 debt	 issues).	 The	






















trial	 detention	 is	 risk	 analysis	 rather	 than	 cash	 payments.215	 Early	
results	seem	promising	as	more	than	94%	of	defendants	were	released	
pre-trial,	 the	 jail	 population	 decreased	 by	 20%,	 and	 only	 forty-four	
defendants	were	subject	to	cash	bail.216	Additionally,	more	than	80%	of	
release	 decisions	were	made	within	 twenty-four	 hours	 of	 arrest,	 and	
only	 0.5%	 of	 release	 decisions	 were	 made	 after	 forty-eight	 hours	 of	
arrest.217	The	reforms	have	not	resulted	in	increased	crime	or	increased	
rates	 of	 non-appearance	 for	 trial.218	 A	 2019	 report	 to	 the	New	 Jersey	
governor	concluded:	
New	 Jersey’s	 jail	 population	 looks	 very	 different	 today	 than	 it	 did	
when	the	idea	of	reforming	the	state’s	criminal	justice	system	began	
to	take	hold	 in	2013.	On	any	given	day,	 there	are	thousands	fewer	
defendants	 in	 jail,	with	only	 the	highest-risk	defendants	and	 those	
charged	with	the	most	serious	offenses	detained.	




















	 218.	 New	 Jersey	 Reform	 Leader	 Says	 Better	 Data	 Strengthened	 Bail	 System,	 PEW	 CHARITABLE	













• Establishing	 standards	 to	 allow	 judges	 to	 determine	 whether	
defendants	have	the	ability	to	pay	criminal	justice	debt.222	




indigent	 defendant	 is	 provided	 counsel)	 determines	 that	 the	
defendant,	based	on	the	established	standards,	has	the	ability	to	
pay	the	debt.224	
• Establishing	 alternatives	 to	 incarceration	 for	defendants	whom	
the	court	determines	do	not	have	the	current	ability	 to	pay	the	
criminal	 justice	 debt.225	 For	 alternatives	 that	 may	 require	






	 222.	 GUIDELINES,	 supra	 note	 209,	 at	 11;	 CRIM.	 JUST.	POL’Y	PROGRAM,	 supra	 note	 210,	 at	 26–32	
(discussing	 legislative,	 judicial,	and	executive	reforms	to	 improve	ability	to	pay	determinations).	















As	with	bail	 reform,	 evidence-based	 approaches	 focusing	on	 risk	
and	treatment	needs	should	be	adopted	in	the	community	supervision	
arena.227	Studies	demonstrate	that	while	supervision	can	be	effective	for	
high-risk	 offenders,	 it	 can	 be	 counterproductive	 for	 low-risk	
offenders.228	 Community	 supervision	 reforms	 have	 demonstrated	 the	






deterrence	 potential	 of	 fines,	 the	 adoption	 of	 this	 proposal	 is	
unlikely.230	
• Establishing	 periodic	 review	 of	 fines	 and	 fees	 to	 determine	
whether	 charges	 should	 be	 modified	 because	 they	 are	
excessive.231	
• Requiring	 state	 and	 local	 authorities	 to	 evaluate	 offenses	 that	
have	 fines	 to	 determine	 whether	 such	 offenses	 should	 be	




• Evaluating	whether	 fees	are	appropriate.235	 In	many	situations,	
the	 efforts	 at	 collecting	 fees	 are	 counterproductive	 with	
	













jurisdictions	 spending	 more	 on	 collection	 efforts	 than	 they	
receive.236	In	2018,	San	Francisco	“became	the	first	county	in	the	
nation	to	eliminate	all	locally	administered	fees	charged	to	people	
leaving	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.”237	 Estimates	 are	 that	 the	
benefits	from	eliminating	over	32	million	dollars	in	fees	for	over	
twenty-one	thousand,	mostly	low-income,	defendants	will	exceed	
the	 expected	 one	 million	 dollar	 loss	 in	 revenue.238	 Alameda	
County	has	followed	San	Francisco’s	example,	and	legislation	that	
would	 eliminate	 fees	 throughout	 California	 is	 pending.239	
Similarly,	 New	 York	 City	 has	 eliminated	 phone	 fees	 for	 jailed	
inmates.240	
• Providing	courts	should	have	flexibility	to	modify	or	waive	fines	






that	 suspend	 driver’s	 licenses	 for	 failure	 to	 pay	 fines	 and	 fees	would	
	
	 236.	 Sobol,	Charging	 the	Poor,	 supra	 note	131,	 at	533–34;	Anne	Stuhldreher,	Op-Ed:	Counties	
Rarely	Collect	Fees	Imposed	on	Those	Formerly	Jailed.	So	Why	Keep	Charging	Them?,	L.A.	TIMES,	May	









	 239.	 Stuhldreher,	 supra	 note	 236,	 at	 6.	 Senate	 Bill	 144	 eliminating	 administrative	 fees	
throughout	California	has	passed	the	California	Senate.	Senate	OKs	Holly	J.	Mitchell	Bill	to	End	Admin	





	 241.	 GUIDELINES,	 supra	 note	209,	 at	1–2;	CRIM.	 JUST.	POL’Y	PROGRAM,	supra	 note	210,	 at	19–22;	
PRINCIPLES,	supra	note	209,	at	6;	SHAFROTH,	supra	note	184,	at	8–9.	An	alternative	that	is	beyond	the	
scope	of	this	Article	is	the	use	of	day-fine	systems	such	as	those	used	by	several	European	countries.	
Beth	 A.	 Colgan,	Graduating	 Economic	 Sanctions	 According	 to	 Ability	 to	 Pay,	103	 IOWA	L.	REV.	 53	
(2017)	(examining	the	limited	experiences	in	the	United	States	with	day	fines).	
	 242.	 GENTZLER,	 supra	 note	 146,	 at	 19.	 For	 a	 more	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 reforms	 aimed	 at	






have	 eliminated	 such	 programs—including	 California,	 Idaho,	
Mississippi,	Montana,	and	Washington,	D.C.244	Even	traditional	political	
foes—the	American	Civil	Liberties	Union	and	the	American	Legislative	








Given	 the	 prevalence	 of	 private	 companies	 in	 the	 correctional	
control	 industry	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 abuse,	 regulating	 the	 role	 of	
private	 companies	 is	 also	 necessary.	 Regulations	 and	 contract	
provisions	 should	 minimize	 conflicts	 of	 interests	 in	 the	 selection,	




technology	 services,	 including	 electronic	monitoring,	 phone,	 banking,	
and	 computer	 services.250	 Although	 technology	 offers	 alternatives	 to	
help	 address	 some	 of	 the	 inequities	 associated	 with	 being	 poor,251	
technology	can	also	exacerbate	access	and	debt	issues,	especially	when	


























potential	 tool	 for	attacking	monetary	 sanctions	 in	 criminal	 cases.	The	
Court	held	that	the	Eighth	Amendment’s	Excessive	Fines	Clause	applies	




goals	 of	 retribution	 and	 deterrence,”	 for	 “fines	 are	 a	 source	 of	
revenue,”	while	other	forms	of	punishment	“cost	a	State	money.”	This	






criminal	 justice	 debt	 imposed	 by	 the	 states	 remains	 uncertain.	Timbs	
























To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 Griffin	 case	 finds	
acceptance	it	will	constitute	a	new	charter	of	freedom	for	the	
poor.	It	will	be	years,	perhaps	decades,	however,	before	we	can	





Now,	 more	 than	 six	 decades	 after	 Griffin,	 subsequent	 judicial	
decisions	and	legislation	do	reflect	some	flight;	however,	in	practice,	the	
predicted	 obstacles	 have	 grounded	 the	 aspirations	 of	 Griffin	 and	 its	
progeny.	Reforms	should	be	adopted	to	allow	Griffin’s	promise	of	equal	
justice	to	fly.	As	Bryan	Stevenson	recognizes,	“[t]he	true	measure	of	our	
character	 is	 how	 we	 treat	 the	 poor,	 the	 disfavored,	 the	 accused,	 the	
incarcerated,	and	the	condemned.”261	
	
	 259.	 Willcox	&	Bloustein,	supra	note	4,	at	26.	
	 260.	 Id.	
	 261.	 STEVENSON,	supra	note	2,	at	18.	
